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GoMEZ

[Sac. No. 6928.

v.

SuPERIOR CouRT

In Bank.

[50 C.2d

July 17, 1958.]

ANTHONY GOMEZ et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OP MENDOCINO COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1a, lb] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.The distinction heretofore drawn by the courts that one convicted of a lesser offense necessarily included in the charge
of a greater may not be tried again on a charge that he has
committed the greater offense, but that, with respect to a
crime divided into degrees, a conviction of a lower degree of
the crime does not operate as an acquittal of the higher, is not
based on sound reason, and neither the Constitution nor the
statutes require one to be drawn.
[2] Id.-Former Jeopardy.-The state with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.
[3] Larceny-Grand and Petty Theft.-The distinctions between
grand and petty theft are in the type of article stolen, whether
the article was taken from the person of another and in its
value (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, 487a, 488); the elements of the
crime remain the same with the exceptions noted.
[4] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-No
distinction should be drawn between lesser included, although
differently defined, crimes and crimes of a lesser degree insofar as the question of double jeopardy is concerned.
[5] Id.- Former Jeopardy- Identity of Offenses.-Prosecutions
are for the same offense when they are for violations of the
same provisions of the criminal law and when the facts on
which they are based are the same.
[6] Id.-Plea-Double Jeopardy.-Defendants seeking dismissal
of grand theft charges subsequent to reversal of a petty theft
conviction did not waive their rights to urge the question of
double jeopardy, though the plea did not name the court, place
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 94 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 173 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 359 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5, 8] Criminal Law, § 145; [2]
Criminal Law, § 117; [3] Larceny, § 2; [6] Criminal Law, § 199;
[7] Criminal Law, § 206; [9] Prohibition, § 14(2); Mandamus,
§ 15(9).
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and time of the former trial (Pen. Code, § 1017, subds. 3, 4),
where the plea was substantially in the form prescribed by
Pen. Code, § 1017.
[7] Id.-Plea-Waiver.-Defendants seeking dismissal of grand
theft charges subsequent to reversal of a petty theft conviction
did not waive their plea of double jeopardy by appealing from
the former conviction, though Pen. Code, § 1262, provides that
"If a judgment against the defendant is reversed, such reversal
shall be deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate
court shall otherwise direct," and though Pen. Code, § 1180,
declares that "The granting of a new trial places the parties
in the same position as if no trial had been had"; the code
sections are not a bar to a plea of double jeopardy, and defendants should not be forced to choose between appealing
an erroneous conviction of petty theft and their constitutional
guarantee that they shall not twice be placed in jeopardy for a
charge of grand theft.
[8] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of O:lfenses.-Double jeopardy
attaches when defendants are threatened with a second trial
on a grand theft charge of which they were impliedly acquitted
at the first trial on being found guilty only of petty theft.
[9] Prohibition-Adequacy of Other Remedies: Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-Prohibition to restrain the superior
court from trying defendants on a grand theft charge subsequent to reversal of their conviction of petty theft under an
indictment charging either grand or petty theft, and mandamus
to compel the superior court to transfer the cause to the appropriate justice court for disposition of the petty theft charge,
are proper remedies where the remedy at law is neither speedy
nor adequate under the facts, and especially where the question before the court is one of jurisdiction to place defendants
again on trial for the offense charged.

PROCEEDINGS in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Mendocino County and Hale McCowen, Judge
thereof, from proceeding with the trial of a criminal action,
and in mandamus to compel that court to transfer the cause to
the appropriate justice court. Writs granted.
Kasch & Cook and Leo M. Cook for Petitioners.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and
J. M. Sanderson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Petitioners, Anthony Gomez and Ray Cardinal, seek writs of prohibition and mandate against the superior Court of the County of Mendocino. Petitioners seek the
50 C.2d-2l
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writ of prohibition to restrain the superior court from proceeding with the trial of the grand theft charge and the writ
of mandate to compel the superior court to transfer the cause
to the appropriate justice court for the disposition of the
charge of petty theft.
On March 19, 1957, an information was filed against petitioners charging them with a felony, the violation of section
484 of the Penal Code.* Petitioners were accused of the theft
of a P & H Loading Shovel of the value of $3,000, the personal
property of one Casteel, to which charge they pleaded not
guilty. The cause was tried to a jury which, after trial and
argument, had submitted to it three forms of verdict: (1)
Guilty of grand theft; (2) guilty of petty theft; and (3) not
guilty. The verdict of the jury was that petitioners were
guilty of petty theft. The court pronounced judgment and
sentenced each of them to pay a $500 fine and serve a six
months' term in the county jail. Petitioners appealed, and
the District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment because
of prejudicial misconduct on the part of the district attorney
(People v. Cardinal, 154 Cal.App.2d 835 [316 P.2d 1001],
October 31, 1957).
From the opinion of the District Court of Appeal (154 Cal.
App.2d 835), it appears that petitioners admitted that they
dismantled and sold as scrap, a loading shovel which they said
they had purchased from one Berry who purported to be the
owner thereof. A receipt bearing the signature "W. H.
*"Every person who shall feloniously steal, take, carry, lead, or drive
away the personal property of another, or who shall fraudulently appropriate property which has been entrusted to him, or who shall knowingly
and designedly, by any false or fraudulent representation or pretense,
defraud any other person of money, labor or real or personal property,
or who causes or procures others to report falsely of his wealth or
mercantile character and by thus imposing upon any person, obtains
credit and thereby fraudulently gets or obtains possession of money, or
property or obtains the labor or service of another, is guilty of theft.
In determining the value of the property obtained, for the purposes of
this section, the reasonable and fair market value shall be the test,
and in determining the value of services received the contract price
shall be the test. If there be no contract price, the reasonable and going
wage for the service rendered shall govern. For the purposes of this
section, any false and fraudulent representation or pretense made shall
be treated as continuing, so as to cover any money, property or service
received as a result thereof, and the complaint, information or indictment may charge that the crime was committed on any date during
the particular period in question. The hiring of any additional employee
or employees without advising each of them of every labor claim due
and unpaid and every judgment that the employer has been unable to
meet shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.'' (Pen. Code,
§ 484.)
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Berry" was introduced in evidence but Berry was not produced as a witness.
Petitioners now allege that they have been ordered to proceed to trial on a charge of grand theft; that they have moved
the respondent to dismiss the grand theft charge against them
on the ground that they have been once in jeopardy and have
been acquitted of the grand theft charge; that respondent has
no jurisdiction to try them on the sole remaining charge of
petty theft and that the matter should be transferred to the
Justice Court for the Little I1ake Judicial District, Mendocino County, which is the appropriate court for the retrial of
the petty theft charge.
Section 687 of the Penal Code provides that "No person can
be subjected to a second prosecution for a public offense for
which he has once been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted." Section 1023 of the Penal Code provides: "When
the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been once placed
in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction,
acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged in such accusatory pleading, or for an attempt
to commit the same, or for an offense necessarily included
therein, of which he might have been convicted under that
accusatory pleading.'' Article I, section 13, of the California
Constitution provides, in part, that "No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense . . . . "
[la] In California a distinction has been drawn by the
courts to the effect that where one is convicted of a lesser
offense necessarily included in the charge of a greater offense,
he may not be tried again on a charge that he has committed
the greater offense. On the other hand, where a crime
divided into degrees is concerned, a conviction of a lower
degree of the crime has been held not to operate as an
acquittal of the higher degree. In other words, it has been
held that where one is found guilty of a lesser and necessarily
included offense he has been placed in jeopardy and cannot
again be tried for the greater offense with which he was
originally charged; but where one is found guilty of second
degree burglary, for example, the conviction is not considered
an acquittal of a charge of first degree burglary or that the
defendant has been once in jeopardy. The reasoning appears
to be that in the crimes which are divided into degrees but
one crime or offense has been charged and that a reversal
by an appellate court, or the granting of a new trial operates
to set aside the whole verdict leaving the entire matter at
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large. Petitioners here rely on the cases holding that the
conviction of a lesser offense operates as an acquittal of the
greater charged offense (People v. Gilmore, 4 Cal. 376 [60
Am.Dec. 620] ; People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227 [33 P. 901] ;
In re Hess, 45 Cal.2d 171 [288 P.2d 5] ), and the People rely
on the cases where "degree" crimes were involved (People v.
Kee[e1·, 65 Cal. 232 [3 P. 818]; People v. McNeer, 14 Cal.App.
2d 22 [57 P.2d 1018]; In re Moore, 29 Cal.App.2d 56 [84
P.2d 57]).*
In the recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184 [78 S.Ct. 221, 2 I1.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119], where
a prosecution for first degree murder was involved, a divided
court held that where a jury had found the defendant guilty
of second degree murder, and on appeal the conviction was
reversed, the defendant could not be again tried for first
degree murder because to do so would place him twice in
jeopardy for the same offense in violation of the constitutional
guarantee contained in the Fifth Amendment. The People
contend that the double jeopardy provisions of the federal
Constitution have never been applied to the states and that
the rule of the Green case is not determinative of the case
at bar.
There appears to be no sound reason for the distinction
drawn by the California cases, and our constitutional provision and statutes certainly do not require one to be drawn.
[2] As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in the Green case, "The
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty." (78
S.Ct. 221, 223.) In California, burglary is a crime divided
into two degrees. It is defined as follows: ''Every person who
enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse,
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent,
vessel, railroad car, trailer coach as defined in the Vehicle
Code ... with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any
felony is guilty of burglary." (Pen. Code, § 459.) Section
460 provides: '' 1. Every burglary of an inhabited dwellinghouse or building committed in the night-time, and every
"Plea of double jeopardy held waived in burglary case.
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burglary, whether in the daytime or night-time, committed by
a person armed with a deadly weapon, or who while in the
commission of such burglary arms himself with a deadly
weapon, or who while in the commission of such burglary
assaults any person, is burglary of the first degree.
"2. All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree."
If a person .is accused of first degree burglary, and under
the evidence a jury returns a verdict of second degree burglary, it has impliedly found that the accused did not enter
an inhabited dwelling-house in the nighttime, or was not
armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the
crime, or that he did not assault any person during the commission of the crime. Insofar as the elements of the crime
of burglary are concerned, they remain the same except for
the difference between the two degrees, and since the jury
had before it all of the evidence pertaining to the crime
allegedly committed by the accused, the distinction in the two
lines of cases appears unsound. The elements necessary for
first degree murder differ from those of second degree murder
in much the same way. A jury impliedly decides that the
necessary element of the greater crime is lacking under the
evidence and returns a verdict finding the defendant guilty
of the lesser degree.
In the case under consideration, petitioners were charged
with grand theft of an article of the alleged value of $3,000.
The jury found them guilty of petty theft-or, in other words,
the jury which heard the evidence found them guilty, but
impliedly determined that the value of the article stolen did
not exceed $200.
[3] The distinctions between grand and petty theft according to the Penal Code are in the type of article stolen, whether
the article was taken from the person of another and in
the value thereof. (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, 487a, 488.) The
elements of the crime remain the same with the exceptions
noted. In People v. Ny Sam Chung (1892), 94 Cal. 304, 307
[29 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29], a prosecution for grand larceny
was held barred after the court had dismissed a charge of
petty larceny against the defendants. The court said: "It
follows that if defendants were placed in jeopardy by reason
of the proceedings in the police court, their trial in the superior court was a second jeopardy, and they are entitled to their
discharge." This case was, of course, decided prior to the
1927 amalgamation of the crimes of larceny, embezzlement,
false pretenses and kindred offenses under the cognomen of
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theft. However, no elements of the former crimes have been
changed. In People v. Myers, 206 Cal. 480, 483 [275 P. 219],
the court was discussing the change made by the 1927 amendment and held: "No elements of the former crimes have been
changed by addition or subtraction. This is particularly true
of the crime of larceny. All former elements of this offense
are perpetuated and contained in section 484 as amended.''
In the Ny Sam Chung case the question presented was whether
the defendants had stolen a gold bracelet of the value of $27
from Jeong Koong. After the evidence was all in, the prosecuting attorney suggested that the property had been taken
from the person of Koong and that the offense was grand
larceny, rather than petty larceny. The court ordered the
action dismissed and the defendants were thereafter placed on
trial in the superior court on a charge of grand larceny "upon
an information alleging the same facts set out in the complaint
in the police court, and the further fact that the property was
taken from the person of said Jeong Koong. '' This court
specifically held that defendants had been once in jeopardy
and the judgment and order was reversed "with directions to
discharge the defendants and dismiss the proceedings.'' Inasmuch as the elements of the crime remain the same, there
appears to be no reason to distinguish the Ny Sam Chung case
on the ground that it was decided prior to the 1927 legislation
heretofore considered. In People v. Stanhope, 37 Cal.App.2d
631 [99 P.2d 1075], defendant was charged with grand theft,
"to which accusation he entered a plea of not guilty, was
tried before a jury, and convicted of the lesser offense of
petty theft. His motion for a new trial having been denied
and probation granted, the defendant appeals from the order
denying him a new trial.'' In affirming the judgment, the
court said : ''In view of the provisions of section 487 and 488
of the Penal Code, it is at once apparent that the jury resolved
the doubt concerning the amount of money involved, in appellant's favor and found him guilty of petty theft. If this was
error, it was certainly error of which appellant cannot complain." (P. 636.) In other words, the court considered the
crime of petty theft necessarily included in a charge of grand
theft. In People v. Simpson, 26 Cal.App.2d 223, 229 [79
P .2d 119], where the jury improperly fixed the defendants'
guilt as grand theft, the appellate court modified the judgment so as to find the degree of the crime to be petty theft.
In other words, the appellate decision was a recognition of
the fact that petty theft is necessarily included within a charge
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of grand theft. In People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387, 391 [281
P. 609], where the defendant was found guilty of first degree
murder by a jury, this court modified the judgment so as to
find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. It was held that
"Section 1181 of the Penal Code,* as amended in 1927 ( Stats.
1927, p.1037), which must now be considered for the first time
by this court, provides that if the evidence (in criminal causes)
shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime
of which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof
or of a lesser crime included therein, the trial court may
modify the judgment accordingly without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend to any court to
which the cause may be appealed." (Emphasis added.) (See
also People v. Castro, 37 Cal.App.2d 311, 315 [99 P.2d 374] ;
People v. Cowan, 38 Cal.App.2d 231, 248 [101 P.2d 125],
reduction of conviction of first degree murder to that of
second degree; People v. La]l'leur, 42 Cal.App.2d 50, 57 [108
P.2d 99], reduction of conviction of first degree murder to
that of second degree; People v. Lynch, 60 Cal.App.2d 133,
145 [140 P.2d 418], conviction of first degree burglary reversed because "as a matter of law he [defendant] was
entitled to a finding pursuant to section 1097 of the Penal
Code that the offense was of the second degree''; People v.
Slater, 60 Cal.App.2d 358, 371 [140 P.2d 846], conviction of
second degree murder reduced to manslaughter; People v.
Daniel, 65 Cal.App.2d 622, 636 [151 P.2d 275], conviction
of first degree murder reduced to second degree murder.)
[ 4] The above cited cases make no distinction between lesser
included, although differently defined, crimes and crimes of a
lesser degree when the question involved is whether the appellate court should modify the judgment without ordering a
new trial. It appears to us that no distinction should be
drawn insofar as the question of double jeopardy is concerned.
In People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 589, 596, 597 [184 P.2d 512),
defendant was charged with both statutory rape and lewd
and lascivious conduct. In reversing, we said : ''The test in
this state of a necessarily included offense is simply that
*"When the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if
the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the
crime of which he was conYicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof,
or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify the verdict,
finding or judgment accordingly without granting or ordering a new
trial, and this power shall extend to any court to which the cause may be
appealed. . . '' (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 6; italicized words added by
1951 amdt.)
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where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily
committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included
offense. (People v. Krupa, 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [149 P.2d
416] .) Thus, a prosecution for battery cannot be followed
by a prosecution for assault based upon the same acts. An
assault is a necessary element of battery, and it is impossible
to commit battery without assaulting the victim. The assault,
to adopt the statutory language, is 'necessarily included
therein.' (People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192, 194 [69 P.
1006, 92 Am.St.Rep. 81, 59 L.R.A. 578] .)
''Although section 1023 refers to a situation where the
prosecution for the greater offense is first in time, there is no
such limitation in the cases. If the defendant is tried first
for assault and later for battery, the prosecution for the included offense bars the subsequent prosecution for the greater
offense. (People v. McDaniels, supra, at p. 195; People v.
Defoor, 100 Cal. 150, 154 [34 P. 642] ; People v. Ny Sam
Chung, 94 Cal. 304, 306 [29 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29] ; see
Official Draft on Double Jeopardy, supra, § 17 ; 1 Bishop's
Criminal Law (9th ed.) § 1057; 2 Freeman on Judgments
(5th ed.) § 559.) 'A conviction of the lesser is held to be a
bar to [the] prosecution for the greater on the theory that
to convict of the greater would be to convict twice of the
lesser.' (People v. Krttpa, sttpra, at p. 598.) If this were
not the rule, section 1023 could be vitiated by the simple device
of beginning with a prosecution of the lesser offense and proceeding up the scale.'' (For an excellent discussion on necessarily included offenses, see People v. Marshall, 48 Cal.2d 394
[309 P.2d 456].)
[5] Viewing the matter realistically it appears that drfendants here would be tried again on the same set of facts
as prevailed when they were found guilty of petty theft. The
American Law Institute defines ''same offense'' as follows:
"Prosecutions are for the same offense when they are for
violations of the same provisions of the criminal law and
when the facts on which they are based are the same." (Emphasis added; Official Draft on Double Jeopardy, Administration of the Criminal Law, American Law Institute, § 5.)
(See also People v. Defoor, 100 Cal. 150 [34 P. 642] ; People v.
McDaniels, 137 Cal. 192 [69 P. 1006, 92 Am.St.Rep. 81, 59
L.R.A. 578].)
While it is true as argued by the People that the double
jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States have not definitely been held ap-
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plicable to the states as encompassed in the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the language in the Green
case (78 S.Ct. 221, supra) is certainly persuasive. (And see
Haag v. State, 356 U.S. 464 [78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913],
dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas and Black.) The
guarantee against double jeopardy in the California Constitution is almost precisely the Rame as that found in the federal
Constitution. Article I, section 13, of our Constitution is
entitled "CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS-RIGHTS OF AccusED. DuE
PRocEss OF I1AW . •JEOPARDY. CoMMENT ON FAILURE OF DEFENDAN'l' 'l'O TESTIFY. DEPOSITIONS." It would appear from this that
the framers of our Constitution considered the prohibition
against twice in jeopardy as part of the concept of due process
of law. In the Green case (p. 229) the court said: "We believe
that if either of the rationales offered to support the Trono
result [Trona v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (26 S.Ct. 121,
50 L.Ed. 292)] were adopted here it would unduly impair the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The right
not to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same
offense is a vital safeguard in our society, one that was dearly
won and one that should continue to be highly valued. If
such great constitutional protections are given a narrow,
grudging application they are deprived of much of their
significance. We. do not feel that Trono or any other decision
by this Court compels us to forego the conclusion that a
second trial of Green for first degree murder was contrary
to both the letter and spirit of the Fifth Amendment.'' It
appears to us that if the spurious distinction made by the
California cases is perpetuated in the case at bar we would
be giving our constitutional prohibition against twice in
jeopardy a "narrow, grudging application" unsupported by
either logic or reason.
[6] The People argue that defendants have waived their
rights to urge the question of double jeopardy. This contention
appears to be based first on the ground that the question of
double jeopardy was not raised by plea as required by sections
1016 and 1017 of the Penal Code. A copy of the minute
order, dated March 21, 1958, in the case of People of the State
of California, plaintiff, v. Anthony Gomez and Ray Cardinal,
defendants, Number 3124-C, is as foJlows: "This matter came
on at this time to be set, both defendants present; Frank
Petersen, Deputy District Attorney appearing for the People
and Leo Cook appearing as counsel for defendants. Defendants entered pleas of Not Guilty by reasons once in jeopardy
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and of prior acquittal. Request by counsel for release upon
own recognizance or that bail be reduced denied. Order that
bail remain as is. It is ordered that the matter be and is set
for trial May 5, 6, and 7, 1958 and on the calendar April 25,
1958 to draw jury.'' While the minute order does not show
that defendants named the court, the place and the time, of
the former trial (Pen. Code, § 1017, subds. 3, 4), it appears
that the statute was substantially followed since it is provided: ''Every plea must be made in open court and may be
oral or in writing, and must be entered upon the minutes of
the court and must be taken down in shorthand by the official
reporter if there is one present. The plea, whether oral or
in writing, must be in substantially the following form .... ''
(Pen. Code, § 1017.) In re Burns, 78 Cal.App.2d 294 [177
P.2d 649], relied upon by the People is not in point since there
the defendants sought to raise the plea of once in jeopardy
by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after a third trial
in which all five of them were found guilty. (The first two
trials had resulted in disagreements of the jury.) In re Harron, 191 Cal. 457, 469 [217 P. 728], relied upon by the People,
was also a proceeding in habeas corpus brought after the
defendant was convicted upon a second complaint for battery
and after the judgment had become final. The court held
that ''after final judgment, habeas corp1ts cannot be used
as a writ of error, and petitioner has not met the burden of
showing he exhausted below the defense upon which he must
rely, [and] he is not entitled to relief."
[7] The People next argue that petitioners have waived
their plea of double jeopardy iu that they appealed their
conviction, relying upon section 1262 of the Penal Code which
provides: "If a judgment against the defendant is reversed,
such reversal shall be deemed an order for a new trial, unless
the appellate court shall otherwise direct. If the appellate
court directs a final disposition of the action in the defendant's
favor, the court must, if he is in custody, direct him to be
discharged therefrom .... '' The People also rely on section
1180 of the Penal Code which provides: "The granting of a
new trial places the parties in the same position as if no trial
had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and
the former verdict or finding cannot be used or referred to,
either in evidence or in argument, or be pleaded in bar of any
conviction which might have been had under the accusatory
pleading." There is obviously no merit to this contention. In
that line of cases holding that double jeopardy attaches when
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a conviction has been had on a necessarily included offense
(In re Hess, 45 Cal.2d 171 [288 P.2d 5]; People v. Greer,
30 Cal.2d 589 [184 P.2d 512] ; People v. McFarlane, 138 Cal.
481 [71 P. 568, 72 P. 48, 61 L.R..A. 245]; People v. Smith, 134
Cal. 453 [66 P. 669]; People v. Gordon, 99 Cal. 227 [33 P.
901] ; People v. Kn~pa, 64 Cal..App.2d 592 [149 P.2d 416])
the Penal Code sections relied upon by the People have not
been considered as a bar to a plea of double jeopardy.
Insofar as the People's contention reaches the question
of waiver, because of defendants' successful appeal from
the petty theft conviction, the matter was admirably discussed
in the Green case where it was held: "Using reasoning which
purports to be analogous to that expressed by Mr. Justice
Holmes in Kepner [Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (24
S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114)], the Government alternatively
argues that Green, by appealing, prolonged his original
jeopardy so that when his conviction for second degree murder was reversed and the case remanded he could be tried
again for first degree murder without placing him in new
jeopardy. We believe this argument is also untenable. Whatever may be said for the notion of continuing jeopardy with
regard to an offense when a defendant has been convicted of
that offense and has secured reversal of the conviction by
appeal, here Green was not convicted of first degree murder
and that offense was not involved in his appeal. If Green had
only appealed his conviction of arson and that conviction had
been set aside surely no one would claim that he could have
been tried a second time for first degree murder by reasoning
that his initial jeopardy on that charge continued until every
offense alleged in the indictment had been finally adjudicated.
"Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in
order to secure the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one
offense, a defendant must surrender his valid defense of
former jeopardy not only on that offense but also on a different
offense for which he was not convicted and which was not
involved in his appeal. Or stated in the terms of this case,
he must be willing to barter his constitutional protection
against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death
as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction of another offense for which he has been sentenced to five
to twenty years' imprisonment. .As the Court of .Appeals said
in its first opinion in this case, a defendant faced with such a
'choice' takes a 'desperate chance' in securing the reversal
of the erroneous conviction. The law should not, and in our
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judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible
dilemma. Conditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced
surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy." (Pp. 226-227.)
Under the theory presented in the case at bar by the
People, these defendants would be forced to choose between
appealing an erroneous conviction of petty theft and their
constitutional guarantee that they shall not twice be placed
in jeopardy for a charge of grand theft. People v. Green,
47 Cal.2d 209, 235 [302 P.2d 307], relied upon by the People
is not pertinent. In the Green case defendant appealed
from a conviction of first degree murder with the penalty
fixed at death. We affirmed the judgment of first degree
murder and reversed only so far as the penalty was concerned. Petitioners here would have no claim that they were
twice in jeopardy by being subjected to a second trial, after
reversal by an appellate court, on the petty theft charge only.
Here, as in the case of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
[78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119], defendants
were found guilty of the lesser crime and their appeal was
from that judgment. [8] Double jeopardy attaches when
they are threatened with a second trial on the greater charge
of grand theft of which they were impliedly acquitted
at the first trial where they were found guilty only of petty
theft. People v. d'A Philippa, 140 Cal.App. 236 [35 P.2d
134], also relied upon by the People is not in point. In the
d'A Philippo case, the defendant was pronounced an habitual
criminal. This court set aside that particular adjudication on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to sentence
him as an habitual criminal and reversed the judgment with
" . . . ' . . . directions to the court below to resc:ntence defendant, as required by law. (220 Cal. 620 [32 P.2d 962].)'"
The appellate court held that the resentencing of the defendant did not constitute double jeopardy.
[9] The People contend, finally, that neither prohibition
nor mandamus are proper remedies at this time. It is again
argued that petitioners did not raise the plea of double
jeopardy as provided for in sections 1016 and 1017 of the
Penal Code. As previously shown by the record, the plea
was raised in accord with the statutes and the remedies sought
are proper. In Jackson v. S1tperior Cot[rt, 10 Cal.2d 350, 353
[74 P.2d 243, 113 A.L.R. 1422], the same point was made
by the respondents, and quoting from the opinion of the
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District Court of Appeal in the same case, it was said:" 'Respondents urge that the writ [prohibition) should not be
issued because petitioners possess a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law whereby they may preserve the rights which
they hope to protect in this proceeding, They maintain that
the plea of former jeopardy is one which the petitioners may
or may not enter, their action depending on themselves and
their counsel; that if the trial court was in error in refusing
their request to enter these pleas, and was in error in concluding that jeopardy had not attached, those questions might
be raised on appeal if they should be convicted at their second
trial, and would serve as a sure ground for reversal of the
judgments which might be pronounced against them, which reversals would result in their discharge after the appeal had
been decided. That the right to raise this question on appeal
is plain cannot be doubted. That it is either speedy or adequate is open to serious question . . . . In view of the considerable discretion vested in us in issuing these writs we are
constrained to hold that while the remedy at law is plain
it is neither speedy nor adequate under the facts before us
and especially in view of the fact that in its final analysis
the question before us is one of the jurisdiction of respondents
to again place petitioners on trial for the offenses charged in
the indictment found against them. (M enjou v. Superior
Court, 128 Cal.App. 117 [16 P.2d 1007]; Ilnntington v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.App. 288 [90 P. 141] ; Oliver v. Superior
Court, 92 Cal.App. 94 [267 P. 764].)'"
[lb] It is our opinion that there is no sound basis for the
distinction heretofore drawn by the courts of this state insofar
as lesser included offenses and degree crimes are concerned
and that petitioners here should be considered as having been
once in jeopardy. Inasmuch as the facts here presented bring
petitioners squarely within the constitutional prohibition
against placing a defendant twice in jeopardy, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the prohibition against
double jeopardy is part of the due process clause.
The writs should issue as prayed for, and it is so ordered.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent, for the reasons stated by Mr.
Presiding Justice Van Dyke in the opinion prepared by him
for the District Court of Appeal in Gomez v. Supe1·ior Court
of Mendocino County, (Cal.App.) 322 P.2d 292.

